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In realistic continuous-variable quantum key distribution protocols, an eavesdropper may exploit the addi-
tional Gaussian noise generated during transmission to mask her presence. We present a theoretical framework
for a post-selection-based protocol which explicitly takes into account excess Gaussian noise. We derive a
quantitative expression of the secret key rates based on the Levitin and Holevo bounds. We experimentally
demonstrate that the post-selection-based scheme is still secure against both individual and collective Gaussian
attacks in the presence of this excess noise.
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Continuous-variable quantum key distribution CV QKD
1 was introduced as an alternative to the original discrete
variable single photon schemes 2. CV QKD promises to
offer higher secret key rates, better detection efficiencies, and
higher bandwidths than its single photon counterpart and is
easily adapted to current communication systems. Currently
the two main protocols in CV QKD are post-selection PS
3 and reverse reconciliation RR 4. These protocols are
based on the random Gaussian modulation of coherent states
using either homodyne 4 or heterodyne 5 detection and
both have been experimentally demonstrated 6–10. At
present PS-based CV QKD has practical advantages in terms
of key distillation and has been demonstrated experimentally
for up to 90% channel loss 7.
Reverse reconciliation CV QKD, due to its inherent na-
ture, easily incorporates excess noise into the protocols, and
security proof has been demonstrated in the case of indi-
vidual Gaussian attacks 4,5, non-Gaussian attacks 11, col-
lective attacks 12,13 with their Gaussian optimality 14,
and coherent states using homodyne detection 15. For PS
CV QKD, the addition of excess noise into the analysis is
quite difficult. The original protocol 3 only considered pure
or vacuum states in its scheme, and as yet all post-selection
protocols have concentrated on the unrealistic case of zero
excess noise 7,16,17. Recently however, excess noise using
a hybrid protocol, consisting of both post-selection and either
direct or reverse reconciliation, was considered for the case
of collective attacks 18.
In this paper, we present a protocol for calculating the
effect of excess Gaussian noise EGN on post-selection
where two-way classical communication is permitted, and
show its security when considering either individual or col-
lective attacks. We apply our analysis to an experimental
demonstration and conclude that good key rates can be ob-
tained under the realistic condition of a channel with loss and
excess Gaussian noise Fig. 1.
We extend the original PS CV QKD protocol 3 as fol-
lows. The sender, Alice, draws two random numbers SA
x and
SA
p from Gaussian distributions of variances VA
x and VA
p
, re-
spectively, which she encodes on the amplitude x and phase
p of a coherent beam. Each encoding SA
x
,SA
p represents a
pair of bits whose value is fixed by the sign of the encoding.
The modulated Gaussian beam is then transmitted to the re-
ceiver, Bob, through a lossy and noisy Gaussian channel with
transmission  and variance of EGN . Bob receives a
Gaussian mixed state ˆB with variance VB
x,p
=VA
x,p+1+, and
then randomly measures either the amplitude mB
x or phase mB
p
quadratures of this mixed state. As both amplitude and phase
play the same role, we will only explicitly consider one
quadrature for the rest of this paper, and denote Alice’s en-
coding and Bob’s measurement as SA and mB, respectively.
The probability that Bob measures a particular value mB
given that Alice used a particular encoding SA is given by the
conditional probability,
pmBSA =
e−mB −
SA2/21+VV
21 + VV
, 1
where VV is the variance of the vacuum noise. Note that in
this paper the vacuum noise is normalized to VV=1. The
error rate in Bob deciding whether Alice encoded positively
or negatively is thus given by
Pe =
1
1 + e2SAmB/1+VV
. 2
The mutual information rate between Alice and Bob is given
as a function of this error probability using the Shannon
formula 19 IAB=1−2Pe, where
x = 12 1 + xlog21 + x + 1 − xlog21 − x . 3
Bob then informs Alice over a public channel which quadra-
ture he measured and at what time interval. Alice and Bob
then both announce the absolute values of their encodings
SA and measurement results mB, respectively. This is in
contrast to previous zero excess noise protocols where only
Alice announces her absolute value 3,7. Alice and Bob then
post-select information for which they have a mutual infor-
mation advantage over Eve and discard information for
which they do not. Alice and Bob also choose a random
subset of data to characterize the channel loss , the EGN ,
and check that the statistics are Gaussian. Finally Alice and
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Bob use a two-way reconciliation algorithm to reconcile
their data.
As with any type of eavesdropping attack, we assume any
EGN on the quantum channel is always attributed to, and
controlled by, the eavesdropper, Eve. The fact that there ex-
ists excess noise on the channel allows Eve to be entangled
to Bob. There exists a known upper bound 2 16 to the
amount of EGN  that can be added on a channel of trans-
mission  above which Alice’s and Bob’s quantum correla-
tion cease to exist 4. We consider here the entangling
cloner attack which has been shown optimal for PS CV QKD
with collective attacks in the presence of EGN 18. The
entangling cloner attack see Fig. 1b consists of Eve re-
placing the lossy line by a beam splitter of transmission 
where one of the inputs is Alice’s initial state in a quadrature
basis given by
A = 2−1/4 dx1e−1/4x1 − SA2x1 4
and the second input is one arm of an entangled state Eve has
created given by
EPR =
1
2   dx2dx3e1/4−Vsx22−x32/Vs	 12 x2 + x3

		 12 x2 − x3
 , 5
where 12 Vs+1/Vs= 1−+ / 1− is the variance of the
entangled beam she injects to simulate the EGN . Eve keeps
one of the entangled beams denoted E1 and one of the
outputs of the beam splitter denoted E2 while she sends the
remaining output to Bob denoted B through a perfect noise-
less and lossless line. When Bob performs his homodyne
measurement and announces its absolute value mB, Eve’s
state collapses to one of the four possible pure states given
by b
aE1,E2, where the superscript a=0,1 refers to Alice’s
encoded bit and the subscript b=0,1 to Bob’s measured bit,
b
aE1,E2 =
1
23/4   dx2dx3e−1/4− 1bmB/ − − 1aSA − 1 − /2x3 − x22+x22Vs+x32/Vs
		− − 1b1 − 

mB − 12 x2 − x3
E2	 12 x2 + x3
E1. 6
Note that this state is not normalized,  = pmBSA given by
Eq. 1. The amount of secure bits that Alice and Bob can
extract for each transmission is given by max{0, IAB
−maxIAE , IBE}. Eve chooses to maximize her information
with either Alice or Bob depending on which will give her
the greater information. If Eve decides to attack Alice, she
needs to distinguish between the states AE
a
= 0
a0
a  + 1
a
	1
a. To attack Bob, she needs to distinguish between the
states BE
b
= b
0b
0  + b
1b
1.
The inner products between these states can be computed
explicitly by performing the Gaussian integrations in Eq. 6.
For example, the four terms that distinguish Eve’s input for
attacking Alice from her inputs for attacking Bob are
0
00
1 = 1
11
0 =
exp− mB2 + 1 + SA221 +  
21 + 
, 7
0
01
0 = 1
10
1 =
exp− 1 + 2mB2 + SA221 +  
21 + 
. 8
We see that at the critical value of mB
c
=1+−
 1+2−1SA, all of the above inner products
are equal. Eve’s input state for attacking Alice is unitarily
equivalent to that for attacking Bob, and hence her accessible
information with Alice is exactly the same as with Bob:
IAE= IBE. When mBmB
c
, Eve would gain more information
by attacking Bob while below this line she stands to gain
more by attacking Alice.
Given Eve’s two input states, we need to find her acces-
sible information. If this is smaller than IAB, Alice and Bob
keep the bit and distill a key from it. Our task now is to find
Eve’s accessible information for such states. We bound this
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FIG. 1. Color online Schematic of setup. Quantum channel of
transmission  and excess noise  is simulated experimentally a
and analyzed theoretically for the entangling cloner attack b.  /2,
half-wave-plate; PBS, polarizing beam-splitter; AM PM, ampli-
tude phase modulators; RNG, independent white noise generators;
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information from above for both individual and collective
attacks.
A bound on Eve’s accessible information IE
i in the case of
individual attacks is calculated by providing her with the
knowledge on whether Alice’s and Bob’s bit values match or
not. With this information, Eve’s input is reduced to two pure
states. Her accessible information is bounded by
IE
i
= p11 − f12 + p21 − f22 , 9
where p1 is the probability that Alice and Bob obtain the
same bits and p2 is the probability that their bits differ, and
f1 =
0
01
1
0
00
0
and f2 =
1
00
1
1
01
0
10
are the normalized inner products between the states that Eve
distinguishes 20. We note that this bound corresponds to
the Levitin bound as given in 3 for the case of no added
noise.
We apply Holevo’s theorem 21 on Eve’s input states, E,
to bound Eve’s information in terms of the von Neumann
entropy, S, and obtain the amount of information IE
c
ac-
cessible by Eve when performing collective attacks,
IE
c
= SE
0 + E
1 − S2E
0/2 − S2E
1/2. 11
Figure 2 shows the difference in mutual information from
Bob’s point of view when Alice announces SA for a fixed
value of  and . For each  and , Alice then chooses the
value of VA
opt such that the weighted integral over the positive
information region  given below is maximized,
Ii,c = 

pSA,mBIAB − IE
i,cdmBdSA. 12
In principle, as long as the post-selection region is non-
empty, Alice and Bob can always distill a finite amount of
key. At a certain noise threshold however, we expect that
there will be no more post-selectable region. This is clear for
=2 16, since then the state between Alice and Bob be-
comes separable. In this case, Eve can do an intercept and
resend attack in which IE IAB for all values of SA and mB.
But even before the separability limit is reached, the post-
selectable region may become empty. To analyze this, we
consider the case when SA is large. In such a case, Alice and
Bob would share the same bits with a high probability. Eve’s
accessible information then tends to 1− f12. In this limit,
Eve’s input becomes ever closer to being just two classical
pure states and so Holevo’s bound would tend to the same
limiting information. Equating this with IAB, we obtain two
solutions for mB
l±
,
mB
l±
=
1 +  ± 1 + 2 −  + 2 + 1 − 
2 + 
SA.
13
In other words, the region of post-selectibility asymptotes to
these two lines as SA increases see Fig. 2. The noise thresh-
old 0 over which the quantum channel is insecure is ob-
tained when the two lines mB
l+ and mB
l− coincide such that
there is no more region of post-selectibility. This occurs
when 1+02=00+20+1−.
Figure 1a shows the schematic of our experiment. In this
setup we encoded keys on the amplitude quadrature and
simulated the loss of the line by using a variable attenuator
and the added noise by adding a random Gaussian signal
onto the amplitude quadrature on Alice’s amplitude modula-
tor. The transmitted light is detected using a homodyne de-
tection setup at Bob’s station. The two sets of time series,
Alice’s encoding SA and Bob’s measurement mB were ana-
lyzed using the tools developed in 7. We note that extrac-
tion of the final key can be performed using the methods
described in 7 with an average efficiency of 2% to 4% for
all data sets with positive raw information rates I.
Figure 3 shows experimental results superimposed onto
theoretical bounds of total post-selected information rates
I= IAB− IE at channel transmission =47% for individual
and collective attacks, as a function of channel EGN . The
experimental mutual information rate between Alice and Bob
IAB is calculated by comparing the two signal-processed time
series SA
x and mB
x
. This quantity is less than the theoretical
calculation due to experimental imperfections associated
with the encoding e.g., nonoptimum encoding variance, de-
tection e.g., homodyne inefficiency, and signal processing.
Experimental uncertainty is calculated for IAB due to the fi-
nite number of data points. The information rate for Eve IE is
calculated theoretically, with error bars in IE calculated using
the uncertainties in channel transmission, EGN, and Alice’s
variance VA.
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FIG. 2. Color online Post-selection regions at =0.5 are
shown in red. a and b show the information rates I= IAB− IE
with no excess noise for individual and collective attacks. c and
d is when =0.2. On the dashed line mB
c in c, Eve can obtain the
same amount of information from Alice as she can from Bob. The
post-selection region asymptotes to the lines mB
l±
.
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The experimental data points Iexp are in good agreement
with the theoretical results. For some of the higher EGN
cases, the error bars extend towards the negative region. It
should be emphasized however, that this is mainly due to the
finite number of collected data that results in statistical un-
certainties. In our experiment, 2.4 Mbits of data were taken
per run. The theoretical curves for I in Fig. 3 monotonically
decreases until they reach exactly zero at the security thresh-
old line. No secure keys can be generated in the shaded
region.
Figure 4 shows the experimental results superimposed on
contour plots of I as a function of  and . Three sets of
experimental runs were taken for 0.2,0.5,0.8. Filled and
unfilled data points indicate Iexp0 and Iexp0, respec-
tively. We obtained positive information rates for =0.2 and
=0.1. In principle, lower  is attainable; the experimental
demonstration for such cases is left for future work.
In conclusion, we have extended the original post-
selection protocol 3 to take into account the effect of chan-
nel EGN for individual and collective Gaussian attacks by an
eavesdropper. In both cases, we find that the scheme is still
secure. We have also presented an experimental demonstra-
tion, which verifies that continuous-variable quantum cryp-
tography using post-selection is secure in the presence of
channel loss as well as EGN. This is important since realistic
laser sources and optical fibers 8 inevitably inherit EGN.
Reanalyzing our results from 7 using the theory presented
in this paper we conclude that the small amount of EGN
present in that experiment would have had negligible effect
on the key rates if properly accounted for.
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FIG. 3. Color online Experimental results superimposed on
theoretical lower bounds of secure key rates at transmission 
=0.47±0.002 when Eve does a collective attack and an individual
attack inset. Unfilled data points with arrows have error bars go-
ing to negative I. The shaded region indicates the noise threshold
for secure keys. The experimental results were obtained using an
encoding variance optimized for the individual attack bound.
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FIG. 4. Color online Experimental results superimposed on
theoretical contour plots of information rate after post-selection
I as a function of channel transmission  and EGN .
a,b,c,d,e indicates I=10−1 ,10−2 ,10−3 ,10−4 ,10−7 bits/
state. Filled unfilled data points indicate Iexp0 Iexp0. No
secure keys can be generated in the shaded regions. Dark shade
indicates separability between Alice’s and Bob’s states.
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